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Contemporary movements for the reform of global institutions advocate greater 
transparency, greater democracy, and greater accountability. Of these three, accountability is the 
master value. Transparency is valuable as means to accountability: more transparent institutions 
reveal whether officials have performed their duties. Democracy is valuable as a mechanism of 
accountability: elections enable the people peacefully to remove officials who have not done 
what it is their responsibility to do. “Accountability,” it has been said, “is the central issue of our 
time.”1  
The focus of this paper is accountability in international development aid: that range of 
efforts sponsored by the world’s rich aimed at permanently bettering the conditions of the 
world’s poor.2 We begin by surveying some of the difficulties in international development work 
that have raised concerns that development agencies are not accountable enough for producing 
positive results in alleviating poverty. We then examine the concept of accountability, and 
survey the general state of accountability in development agencies. A high-altitude map of the 
main proposals for greater accountability in international development follows, and the paper 
concludes by exploring one specific proposal for increasing accountability in development aid. 
 
The Challenges of Development Aid 
International development projects aim to improve the well-being of the poor in the 
medium to long term. According to the World Bank, there are currently more than 80,000 
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development projects underway.3 Typical projects include constructing dams to improve 
irrigation in Laos, teaching basic reading skills to pastoralists in Kenya, staffing remote health-
care clinics in Bangladesh, organizing a farmer’s cooperative in Nepal, and running a micro-
lending program to help poor women start their own businesses in Mali. 
 All of these development projects attempt to transform resources drawn from rich 
individuals into permanent benefits for those living in poverty. Deploying these resources so that 
they make a positive contribution to the lives of poor is always challenging, with the challenges 
coming along three dimensions. First, any given development project will be technically quite 
complex. Second, project resources will tend to be diverted away from the intended 
beneficiaries. Third, the aggregate flow of aid resources into a country can itself generate 
negative effects. Following is a catalogue of the main factors along these three dimensions that 
can make poverty alleviation difficult. 
First, any development project will face technical challenges in design and management.4 
Most development planners face the dilemma that projects must be sensitive to local skills and 
customs to ensure participation and so success; yet the success of a project also turns on effecting 
significant changes in the productive, or political, or reproductive practices of those who are 
meant to participate. Asia and Africa are speckled with decaying infrastructure projects from 
earlier eras of development aid whose operation did not fit with the skills and customs of the 
target populations. Projects intended to resettle communities, or to empower marginalized 
groups, or to democratize local politics typically disrupt settled practices in ways that some 
naturally resist. When a project’s success will depend on a change in gender or sexual 
relations—such as in female literacy or AIDS-prevention projects—these kinds of difficulties are 
intensified. Moreover, the environment in which a project is being executed is likely to change 
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during the period when the project is implemented. Project managers will expect to confront 
economic or environmental shocks, or new directives from local government, or new players 
who enter trying to capture project resources, or new attitudes toward the project and its staff 
among the project’s intended beneficiaries.5 
Second, project resources will typically be diverted away from the project’s target 
population.6 Most of the diversionary pressures on project resources can be traced to the poor 
state institutions within poor countries. In most poor countries state institutions are either quite 
weak, or are strong and self-serving. Indeed most poor people in most poor countries remain 
poor at least in part because their political institutions are inefficient, or venal, or rapacious, or 
absent altogether. 
If a development project is implemented through the ministries of the poor country, 
project funds and supplies may be diverted at the national, district, or local levels of governance. 
If the implementing agency is an international aid NGO, there is also significant potential for 
resource diversion. Aid NGOs often have to fund the government of the poor country directly: 
either to get permission to carry out their projects, or through paying local taxes. These payments 
from NGOs can support the rule of authoritarian leaders and feed corruption in the bureaucracy. 
NGOs must sometimes pay corrupt officials or warlords in order to maintain their headquarters 
in the national capital, and must sometimes pay off or even employ criminals in order to carry 
out their projects in the field. Those who exercise illegitimate power in a country are often glad 
to welcome aid agencies in, as having agencies in the country will increase their opportunities for 
patronage.7 And NGOs by definition have no official power of their own, which limits their 
ability to bargain with governments and criminals. 
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This potential for resource diversion illustrates what might be called “the iron law of 
political economy”: In the absence of good institutions, resources tend to flow toward those who 
have more power. The less powerful people are, the harder it is to get resources to them. A well 
installed in a remote village will not help the poorest if after the aid agency leaves the well is 
taken over by a local gang, thus forcing the poorest villagers to travel even farther to get fresh 
water. The benefits to the poorest of paying doctors to staff rural health clinics will be limited if, 
as in Bangladesh, the doctors are absent from the clinic for 74% of the time for which they are 
paid.8 Even an enormous poverty-relief program like Mexico’s PRONASOL, which spent over 
one percent of the country’s GDP per year for five years, will not relieve poverty if the funds are 
primarily used by public officials to support the ruling party through electioneering and 
clientage.9  
Without the checking mechanisms of good institutions in place, it is difficult to get 
resources for development to flow toward those who have the least power. The richer, stronger, 
healthier, better armed, better fed, better educated, and better located people are, the more likely 
they are to capture the benefits from any stream of resources. 
The third dimension of complexity in development work runs through the other two, and 
emerges from the aggregation of aid resources flowing into a country at any one time. Poor 
governments that receive a significant percentage of their budgets from aid may become less 
capable of independent political action. They may also become more responsive to donors than 
to their own citizens, and they may generate a domestic culture of rent-seeking.10 Significant aid 
inflows may weaken a poor country’s competitiveness, and limit employment growth in labor-
intensive and export industries.11 When multiple donors and ministries fail to coordinate their 
programs there is also considerable potential for waste, coverage gaps, and policy conflict.12 As a 
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recent UNDP report notes, in Tanzania in the mid-1980s some 40 donors maintained 2000 
different aid projects.13 The task of joining up these projects into a coherent overall pro-poor 
strategy would be monumental, even if there were some agency that could take it on.  
In sum, the major challenges in development work arise from the complex nature of the 
projects, from the diversionary pressures on resources, and from the emergent effects of large 
aggregations of aid resources. The presence of these factors decreases the odds that the resources 
put into aid will, ultimately, produce net benefits for the poor.  
The past twenty years have seen a greater awareness of these challenges to success in 
development. This period has also seen a series of discouraging studies on the overall 
effectiveness of development aid.14 These two factors, along with the increasing public 
awareness of the moral imperative to reduce severe poverty, have combined to push the topic of 
accountability to the top of the development agenda. 
 
The Concept of Accountability 
A familiar legal maxim says: “Justice must be done, and justice must be seen to be done.” 
A parallel maxim captures the concept of accountability: “Responsibility must be fulfilled, and 
responsibility must be seen to be fulfilled.” 
Accountability is second-order responsibility. When we say that someone is responsible 
for something, we mean that it is up to them to take care of it. When we say that someone is 
accountable for something, we mean that they have an extra responsibility on top of this—a 
responsibility to be able to show that they have fulfilled their original responsibility. It is up to an 
accountable agent to be able to show that they have done what it is up to them to do.15  
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Accountability always carries with it the possibility of negative evaluation and sanction.16 
An accountable agent who fails to show that they have fulfilled their responsibility may be 
blamed, and subject to warning, reprimand, dismissal, fines, criminal penalties, withholding of 
future donations, removal from office, and so on. Accountability also of course carries the 
possibility of positive evaluation, and so also the possibility of praise, promotion, re-election, 
and so on.17  
An accountable agent is accountable to some person or agency. Accountability has a 
“direction”—it points to those to whom one must give account. For example, the board of a 
corporation has a duty to the shareholders to be able to show that it is running the company well, 
and the shareholders have a corresponding claim that the board be able to account for its 
decisions. 
Any authority at whom accountability points will have distinguishable powers, even 
when these powers are all in the hands of a single actor. A finer analysis will separate out 
standard-setting, performance-measuring, and sanctioning powers. The power to set standards is 
the power to determine what norms the accountable agent must satisfy. The power to judge 
whether the agent has in fact satisfied the relevant norms is a second type of power. The third 
type of power is the power to penalize an agent found to have failed to live up to the norms it is 
bound by. In articulated systems of accountability such as advanced legal systems, these powers 
may be spread among different authorities. For example, within an advanced legal system it may 
be that standard-setting powers are held by a legislature, performance-measuring powers are held 
by grand juries, and sanctioning powers are held by trial judges. 
An agent can be responsible without being accountable. Adults are responsible for 
maintaining their own physical fitness, but they are not accountable to their fellow citizens for 
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this. Similarly, an absolute monarch might be responsible for the good of his people without 
being accountable to anyone for the course of his rule.  
Why is it important sometimes to make agents not only responsible but accountable? 
There are, after all, costs to imposing the extra responsibility of accountability.18 It may be quite 
expensive to be made accountable. For instance, making an aid NGO accountable may mean that 
it has to divert funds away from running programs in order to show that its programs are 
effective. Accountability is also the opposite of trust: making an agent accountable can signal to 
that agent that outsiders distrust the agent to fulfil its responsibilities. Moreover, accountability 
brings with it a certain formal or legal structuring of relationships. The demands of 
accountability may focus the accountable agent’s activities on satisfying certain bureaucratic 
requirements instead of pursuing its underlying mission. Increasing an agent’s accountability can 
even be dangerous, as when greater transparency in an aid agency’s efforts to empower the poor 
allows vested interests more easily to identify and threaten those working for political reform.  
Accountability has costs; yet these costs can sometimes be outweighed. The following 
list sets out some of categories of benefits of accountability: 
 Incentives to agents. An agent who knows that its affairs must be capable of 
withstanding scrutiny will have an incentive to respond to the values of those to whom they are 
accountable. So, commonly, an accountable agent can be expected to put more effort into the 
fulfilling its responsibilities, to be more efficient, to maintain higher ethical standards, to take 
extra care in planning and acting, and so on. Accountable agents also tend to be more consistent, 
since their actions have set visible precedents and are open to challenge.19 
Assurance to principals. Typically accountable agents are representatives of others. Aid 
workers running a polio vaccination program represent those who donated money for that 
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purpose. Making the aid workers accountable provides assurance to the donors that the workers 
have acted so as to discharge some of their responsibilities toward the children. Moreover, 
accountability can help to solve coordination problems by providing this assurance. An 
accountable actor can show that it is capable of discharging its responsibilities, and so may 
become the focal agent of many principals. An NGO with a reputation for accountability may be 
more effective, because many people converge on directing their resources to it. 
 Knowledge. When agents are accountable, their actions are more open to scrutiny. This 
makes it easier to subject their actions to systematic study, and may assist the spread of good 
practices. 
 Transparency. As just mentioned, the knowledge generated by procedures of 
accountability can be instrumentally valuable. Some may also think that a more transparent 
system is morally better in itself, or that transparency is constitutive of a system that has some 
other virtue like justice. 
 Desert. When agents are held accountable, it is more likely that what they receive will 
track what they deserve. Mechanisms of accountability also allow those who are evaluating the 
accountable agent to have more confidence in their judgments about what that agent deserves, 
and it protects the accountable agent against undeserved damage to their reputation. Some may 
also think that certain principals (for example, democratic citizens) have a certain status or 
standing that can only be fittingly recognized by making their agents (government officials) 
accountable to them.  
 
These are some of the values surrounding accountability. Yet making agents more 
accountable is not always beneficial overall. US presidential elections are a mechanism of 
 9 
accountability; yet one could imagine how burdensome it would be were these elections held 
quarterly instead of quadrennially. Increasing accountability can increase efficiency, and 
assurance, and honesty, but it can also waste resources, divert attention toward irrelevant targets, 
and foster distrust. Only when the benefits of making an agent more accountable outweigh the 
costs of doing so will it be morally important to increase that agent’s accountability in some 
specific way. 
 
A Survey of Accountability in International Development 
Accountability should only be increased when its benefits are worth its costs. That fact 
would not be worth special mention had accountability not become a sort of philosopher’s stone 
in recent discussions of development. In the current political environment, it is advantageous for 
development agencies of all kinds to claim that they are highly accountable, even if they are not, 
and even if there is no good reason for them to be so. What follows is an overview of the state of 
accountability in development aid.  
One can get an initial sense of the ethical and practical issues surrounding accountability 
in development aid by viewing development from the broadest moral perspective. Morally, the 
fundamental relationship in international development is between the rich individuals who 
provide resources through taxes or private donations on the one side, and the poor individuals 
who are the intended beneficiaries of these resources on the other. Within this fundamental 
relationship responsibility is not accompanied by accountability. Rich individuals are entirely 
unaccountable to the poor for discharging their responsibilities to aid. If rich individuals fail to 
provide enough resources to address severe poverty, or fail to direct their resources in ways that 
relieve poverty, they face no sanction whatsoever. The power of any collection of poor people to 
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penalize any collection of rich people for generating insufficient or ineffective development aid 
is virtually zero. Moreover, there is no practical way of increasing accountability within this 
relationship. The enforcement of any norms of accountability on rich individuals would impose 
costs that rich individuals would never accept. 
The more specific contemporary concerns about accountability in development have 
centered on the intermediate institutions that link the rich with the poor. Any development effort 
will involve a chain of intermediate institutions, which will typically be made up of some 
combination of institutions of the following four types: governments of rich countries, 
governments of poor countries, international financial institutions (such as the World Bank), and 
aid NGOs.  
The main ethical concern is that these institutions may fail to use the resources entrusted 
to them effectively to relieve poverty. In theory, if these intermediate institutions should be 
accountable to anyone, they should be accountable either to the poor individuals who are the 
intended beneficiaries of the development projects, or to the rich individuals who provide the 
money to fund the projects, or to both.  
However, when we look at these chains of intermediate institutions, we find little power 
of accountability located at either end. Neither rich nor poor individuals presently have much 
ability to sanction these intermediate institutions for failing to turn the resources provided into 
demonstrably effective poverty-relief projects. In the most general terms, this is because the 
intended beneficiaries—who are often well placed to know whether the aid is working—are very 
poor and so have little power to sanction anyone. Meanwhile the rich individual taxpayers or 
donors who might sanction the failure of intermediate institutions face very high costs in 
determining which poverty-relief efforts have been successful.  
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Moreover, the institutions intermediate between the rich funders and the intended 
beneficiaries do not tend to face the pressures that keep other institutions accountable to their 
funders and their beneficiaries. Consider, for example, international aid NGOs. Aid NGOs are 
not run for profit, so are not accountable for providing good projects in the same way that 
businesses are held accountable for providing good products and services through consumer 
choice. Nor of course are aid NGOs accountable to any democratic electorate. And the checks 
that can constrain government agencies, such as media scrutiny and academic study, in fact put 
quite weak pressure on aid NGOs to ensure effectiveness in aiding the poor. Since NGOs are 
bringing money into a poor country, typically by implementing smaller, local projects, the 
government and the media in the poor country generally do not give NGO effectiveness serious 
scrutiny. Moreover, the failure of a complex development project in a poor country is not 
something to which the international media ordinarily attends. While academics do publish 
studies of the effectiveness of NGO-implemented projects, there are presently few paths for 
translating these studies into sanctions for poor performance. And external audits on aid NGOs 
cover only the basics of financial probity, without touching on the effectiveness of the NGOs’ 
projects.20 
The intermediate institutions that are the most accountable to both rich and poor 
individuals are their respective national governments. Here again, however, the degree of 
accountability is quite limited. Rich individuals can in theory put pressure on their counties’ aid 
bureaucracies through elections, lobbying, and public advocacy. Poor individuals can protest—
and in some cases strike or vote—when international aid resources are not used in ways that they 
accept. Yet in general rich individuals find it very difficult to determine which of their 
governments’ poverty relief efforts should be sanctioned for poor performance; and the poor 
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mostly find themselves outmanoeuvred or simply outgunned by the authorities within their 
states.21 So we do not find much power in either rich or poor individuals to sanction intermediate 
institutions for the failure of development projects.  
 
What we do find is some accountability between the connecting links within the chains of 
intermediate institutions. It is these internal relations of accountability that have been the subject 
of most recent attention and movements for reform. For example, there have been several 
proposals to restructure the voting system within the World Bank that aim to make the Bank 
more accountable to the governments of poor countries.22 Or again, OECD countries have 
recently begun to make aid transfers more conditional on good governance in poor countries in 
an effort to make the governments of poor countries more accountable to the governments of rich 
ones.23  
In evaluating such proposals for increasing accountability between linking institutions, 
attention to the costs and the benefits is particularly vital. There is nothing intrinsically valuable 
about making one institution more accountable to another. Increasing accountability between 
institutions always involves costs, and these costs should only be born when they are outweighed 
by the benefits. Reducing severe poverty is by far the most urgent goal of development aid, so 
increasing accountability between institutions will be important primarily insofar as this leads to 
more effective poverty relief. 
A corollary of this thesis is that the mere presence of accountability mechanisms between 
aid institutions is not sufficient to help reduce poverty. Indeed, mechanisms of accountability can 
impede poverty relief. The accountability mechanisms of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which is the main ministry that disburses official American aid, are an 
 13 
example of this.24 USAID budgets operate on a yearly cycle; every year both houses of Congress 
and the State Department negotiate over which programs to fund.25 The State Department 
typically attempts to deploy USAID money to reward or incent the governments of politically 
strategic allies. Congress, by contrast, responds to pressures of American interest groups, such as 
farmers and shippers who want to export excess US grain on US ships, or to ethnic groups who 
want funds channelled to foreign countries where their ethnicity predominates, or to 
manufacturers who want money given to foreign governments on the condition that the money 
be used to buy their manufactured goods.26  
USAID accountability mechanisms work primarily to assist these domestic political and 
economic interests. Because of the competitive nature of the budgeting process, each interest 
group requires a detailed report from the agency who receives the funding—not primarily to 
assess whether a program has benefited the poor overseas, but rather to lay down a negotiating 
marker for the next budget cycle. The result of the USAID budgeting process is a system of 
heavy accountability that hinders poverty relief. The funds that USAID disburses are at best 
contingently related to long-term pro-poor goals, and the accounting requirements on recipient 
aid agencies take resources away from their efforts to help the poor. It should be noted that the 
lack of pro-poor accountability in USAID is not attributable to an idiosyncratic American 
meanness or ineptitude, but rather to the fact that funds are disbursed by a bureaucracy on which 
any pressures to help the foreign poor are almost entirely overwhelmed by pressures arising from 
domestic political and economic interests.27 Accountability mechanisms are unlikely to further 
the cause of poverty reduction if they are not specifically designed to do this. 
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The Accountability of Aid NGOs 
Of all the links of accountability within development aid, the most discussed recently 
have been those involving international aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Care, and Save the Children. 
NGO accountability is in many ways a more revealing topic than World Bank or IMF 
accountability, since these international financial institutions are clearly more accountable 
overall (although perhaps, as many have suggested, not to the right people or in the right ways).28 
NGO accountability is also an intriguing topic because it raises the question of whether NGOs—
which often aim to hold others to account by, for example, publicizing public corruption or 
unfairness in trade—are themselves accountable.29 The goal in examining NGO accountability in 
this section will not be to recommend any particular change in accountability mechanisms, but to 
survey the current state of NGO accountability  and to compare two major approaches to NGO 
reform. 
Financial probity is the aspect of NGO accountability that has received the most public 
attention. Most NGOs are legally accountable to their trustees, who ordinarily provide light 
oversight concerning fiscal management. NGOs must also typically account for their activities to 
the governments of the poor countries in which they operate, and sometimes also to the 
government of the country in which they are based; yet this usually amounts to little more than 
filing some perfunctory reports and being subject to an occasional audit.30 These relatively 
relaxed standards regarding financial probity seem appropriate, since there is a general consensus 
that most aid NGOs handle their finances responsibly. The issue of most serious concern is not 
whether aid NGOs are engaging in defalcation, but whether they are using their resources 
effectively to benefit the poor—not their propriety, but their performance. 
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Regarding performance, no aid NGO is accountable in a significant way for benefiting 
the poor in the long term. If an aid NGO fails effectively to help the poor, there are virtually no 
mechanisms in place to sanction it. NGOs do not release (and as we will see often do not even 
collect) the information about project effectiveness that would enable private donors to hold 
them accountable for their successes and failures. The fundraising materials that aid NGOs target 
at the public are not reliable sources of information for evaluating the agencies’ effectiveness.31 
And the one financial figure that the public has tended to focus on—the ratio of fund-raising to 
administrative costs—has no standard meaning and little relevance to program success. Donor 
countries and multilaterals have recently been increasing their requirements on NGOs to report 
on project planning, finances, and progress.32 Yet these funders generally do not sanction the 
NGOs they fund for lack of long-term benefit to their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, aid 
agencies tend to abide by a “code of silence” that bars them from criticizing each other for 
failing to mount effective projects.33 And aid NGOs are accountable to the recipients of their aid 
for long-term impact virtually not at all.  
Several theorists have observed that this lack of accountability in aid NGOs seems 
remarkable.34 Organizations which have as their mission to improve the long-term conditions of 
the poor have virtually no responsibility to prove that they are accomplishing this mission. From 
the perspective developed here, the lack of accountability in aid NGOs is certainly a matter of 
concern. Yet the lack of NGO accountability should not generate hasty calls for reform.35 
Increasing NGO accountability will only be important when the reforms will be feasible, 
beneficial, and worth the costs that such mechanisms inevitably generate. Increasing NGO 
accountability will only be important insofar as this works to reduce poverty. 
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In contemporary discussions of NGO accountability, there are two main models for 
reform. One is that NGOs should increase their accountability upward—that is, their 
accountability to their trustees, to governments, or to the international financial institutions. The 
other major model for reform is that NGOs should increase their accountability downward—that 
is, their accountability to the poor individuals who are the intended beneficiaries of their 
programs. Each model for reform brings with it characteristic patterns of concerns. 
Proposals for increased upward accountability for NGOs are the most common.36 
Governments and the international financial institutions have under-utilized capacity to sanction 
poor NGO performance by withholding future funding, and governments in particular have the 
ability to set legal requirements on NGOs for greater transparency and efficiency. Governments 
and the international institutions also have a great deal of technical expertise in development, as 
well as research departments with the capacity to collect and analyze a wide range of data on 
which kinds of projects are tending to be successful and which are not.  
However, there are also clear risks in increasing NGOs accountability upward. As we 
have seen in the USAID case, there is always the danger of state-NGO relations being driven by 
political and economic interests within the donor state that have little concern for helping the 
world’s poor. Moreover, procedures for upward accountability tend to be time-consuming and 
bureaucratic. Standardized reports from the field may not reflect the realities in the field, and 
writing these reports takes resources away from implementing the projects. Moreover upward 
accountability tends to be inflexible and only slowly responsive, thus limiting the ability of aid 
agencies to react quickly to the changes in circumstances that inevitably take place on the 
ground. There is also the risk that the threat of sanction will dissuade NGOs from attempting 
innovative strategies for development, or from undertaking more difficult projects.37 Upward 
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accountability is potentially useful for redirecting development aid based on past performance, 
but it risks hindering the effectiveness of the projects that are implemented. 
In recent years there has been considerable enthusiasm for increasing NGO 
accountability downward, much of which has centered on a set of approaches called 
“participatory development”.38 Participatory development aims to engage the poor in the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of the development projects which target their poverty. The idea 
behind participatory development is to involve the poor in projects so that projects become more 
sensitive to local practices and aspirations, while also encouraging greater participation in the 
programs by giving the beneficiaries a sense of ownership in them. For example, Albanian 
villagers have been consulted as to what form a microlending program might take so as to be 
most useful to them, and residents of a Brazilian shantytown have been asked to help develop 
indicators for evaluating the success of a housing rights campaign. The obvious advantages of 
participation are that it draws on the greatest pool of knowledge about local circumstances, while 
also including the poor in projects in ways that can lead to lasting improvements in their 
conditions. 
Involving the poor in the design and implementation of development projects can be an 
effective technique for improving project outcomes. Yet it is difficult to translate such 
involvement into mechanisms for accountability.39 It is one thing to listen to the poor when 
designing a project, and another to give the poor the power to penalize what they judge to be bad 
performance.40 In the terms of the conceptual analysis above, the poor may at best now have 
some limited standard-setting and performance-measuring powers. Yet they always lack the 
crucial power to sanction.41 Even agencies like ActionAid and Save the Children UK, which are 
in the vanguard of agencies promoting participation by the poor, do not allow the poor to 
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penalize agency personnel or to redirect resources against staff wishes. In these agencies’ 
projects information flows to and from the poor, but the power over resources remains as always 
top-down.42 As things stand, this seems almost inevitable. The poor have no way to force NGOs 
to cede power to them, and it is extremely rare for organizations (or, for that matter, for 
individuals) freely to grant to others the power to discipline them for not fulfilling their 
responsibilities.43 
Despite the attractive sound of increased downward accountability, the most feasible 
proposals for reform are therefore those which make rich actors the agents of accountability. 
Only power balances power, and it is in general only the rich and their agents who will be able to 
hold the rich and their agents to account. 
 
A Proposal for Increasing Accountability in Development Aid 
There are many ways of construing the direction of mechanisms for accountability 
besides upward and downward. Recently there have been “hybrid” proposals for “mutual,” 
“diagonal,” and even “transversal” accountability.44 Here I will explore the potential of one 
mechanism of “horizontal” accountability. In horizontal accountability, agents who are engaged 
in an activity regulate themselves. Examples of mechanisms of horizontal accountability are 
ombudsmen, ethics committees, and administrative courts.45 The proposal that follows aims to 
set out a mechanism of horizontal accountability to oversee one of the most important parts of 
the development cycle: the evaluation of projects. This proposal to increase accountability in 
evaluation is put forward as a plan for a feasible mechanism of accountability whose benefits  in 
terms of poverty relief seem likely to outweigh its costs.46 
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The evaluation of a development project is the primary mechanism by which the success 
of the project is judged. Evaluation is therefore the major mechanism through which it could be 
known which development agencies are being effective in alleviating poverty, and which types 
of projects work in different settings.  
Development evaluation is its own professional specialization, with university-based 
training programs, departments within aid agencies and government ministries, a specialized 
literature, international conferences, and so on. Evaluation is professionalized because 
development projects are typically very difficult to assess. An evaluator must judge what effects 
a given intervention (like an AIDS education program or a clean water initiative) has had within 
an extraordinary complex causal environment, and can only make these judgments by 
contrasting the current situation with a counterfactual hypothesis concerning what would have 
happened had the intervention not been made. The difficulties in projecting accurate 
counterfactuals are significant, and the estimation of project effectiveness will depend greatly on 
which hypothesis is chosen.47 Moreover an evaluator must consider not only the effectiveness of 
the project in meeting its goals, but also its efficiency in terms of cost. An evaluator must in 
addition try to predict the long-term effects of the project, since these effects are typically the 
most vital for the project’s success. Because of all of these complexities, there is a great deal of 
latitude in judging how successful any given project has been and will be. 
It is likely that the latitude available to project evaluators, combined with the general lack 
of accountability in development agencies, has resulted in a serious positive bias in project 
evaluation. It is likely, that is, that evaluators tend to attribute more success to projects than is 
warranted.48 We can see why this phenomenon is likely to occur before assessing to the 
significance of its occurrence.  
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The reasons for the positive bias are simply that all parties (besides the poor) have an 
interest in projects being evaluated positively, and that there are few mechanisms of 
accountability in place to check this tendency. Aid agencies have an interest in positive 
evaluations, since these positive reviews will confirm their self-image of effectiveness and 
possibly help with fundraising. The governments of funding countries and recipient countries 
have interests in positive evaluations, since these validate their approval of the projects. And, 
most importantly, the evaluators themselves have strong reasons to submit positive evaluations. 
This is obvious for the “self-evaluations” that are done for most smaller development projects, 
where the group who has implemented the project also judges the success of the project. It is also 
true of evaluators who are hired as outside consultants for larger projects, since these consultants 
know that their future employment may turn on a favorable review of the project of the agency 
that employs them. Even in-house evaluators, like those who work in the institutionally-insulated 
evaluation department of the World Bank, know that the way to get ahead is not to file too many 
reports that their agency’s projects have failed.49  
Examples of falsely positive evaluations, and the pressures to file such evaluations, are 
well-known to evaluation professionals.50 One consequence of this apparently widespread 
positive bias is that it amplifies the difficulties in obtaining reliable information about what types 
of projects work in which settings. The latest report of the evaluation department of the World 
Bank (OED) has concluded that the capacity of the Bank to measure the impacts of its efforts on 
poverty remains weak.51 And a major, independent study of NGO effectiveness states that: 
 
A repeated and consistent conclusion drawn across countries and in relation to all clusters 
of studies is that the data are exceptionally poor. There is a paucity of data and 
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information from which to draw firm conclusions about the impact of projects, about 
efficiency and effectiveness, about sustainability, the gender and environmental impact of 
projects, and their contribution to strengthening democratic forces … and institutional 
capacity.52 
 
As one reviewer concluded, “Multi-country studies raise serious doubts as to whether 
many NGOs know what they are doing, in the sense of their overall impact on people’s lives.”53 
 
The benefits of enhancing the quality of evaluations are straightforward. The 
effectiveness of development assistance depends on the capacity of its practitioners to allocate 
resources in such a way as to maximize development impacts. If project evaluations can 
routinely make sound estimates of likely project impacts and cost-effectiveness, this will 
increase both the capacity and the incentives for planners to make the judgments upon which the 
effectiveness of development assistance depends. Since managers will gain from evaluations a 
more nuanced understanding of the consequences of their resource-allocation choices, the quality 
of these choices will improve over time. Since managers will anticipate that the consequences of 
their choices will be clearly identified in an evaluation, they will be more likely to take 
corrective action when this is needed. Donors who receive credible assurance about the quality 
of development programs and projects will be more confident in increasing their aid budgets. 
Evaluators are currently employed by those who fund the projects that they evaluate. 
These funding organizations have strong interests in receiving positive evaluations of their 
projects’ effectiveness. The structural problem that evaluators face in this way parallels the 
situation of accountants and auditors in publicly traded corporations. The accountants who keep 
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the books and the auditors who check the books are employed by the managers of the firms 
being assessed. Yet the interest of corporate managers in using corporate resources for private 
purposes conflicts with the shareholders’ interest in managers promoting profits. Accountants 
and auditors are protected from being “captured” by the private interests of management by the 
rules of their professions, as codified, for example, in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), which are interpreted by associations of their peers. The aim of the proposed evaluation 
association is to generate an analogous set of principles and institutional capacities for evaluation 
professionals in development aid. A professional association of project evaluators would provide 
a counterweight to the institutional incentives for positive bias, while also improving the 
techniques of project evaluation. 
The evaluation association would have the following structure. It would have a guide 
book, criteria for membership, a stamp, a standards committee, and a repository database. The 
guide book would lay out general principles for project evaluation, focusing on likely project 
impacts and cost-effectiveness. Any member conducting an evaluation under the association’s 
stamp would be bound to follow the approach laid out in the guide book or risk losing 
membership. This rule would be the source of the evaluator’s independence from project 
management. The standards committee would be responsible for determining if evaluations 
comply with the association’s standards. Each evaluation completed under the association’s 
stamp would be indexed and included in a database in the repository. The repository would be 
made accessible to the association’s members, to donor agency officials, and to project 
managers. 
In addition to enhancing evaluator independence, the association would through its 
repository also support methodological advances in evaluation practice. The availability of 
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independent evaluations would create incentives for decentralized improvements in evaluation 
practice, as evaluators use the repository to identify more effective approaches to impact 
assessment problems. These improvements will then in turn feed into improvements in project 
design. In this way the development community could through its own efforts generate a better 
understanding of what works to reduce poverty. 
For the evaluation association to become viable, it would need a critical mass of members 
(evaluators), and these members would need a market for their services. This presents a “chicken 
and egg” challenge for the early stages of the association: evaluators may not invest in joining 
the association without a secure market, and donors may not hire evaluators (possibly at a 
premium) who limit their influence on the evaluation process. Both evaluators and donors may 
recognize that an evaluation association is in the interests of the development community; yet 
they face a collective action problem in getting it off the ground. The best way to address this 
problem is for prospective stakeholders to be involved in designing the association. The initial 
challenge for the evaluation association would be to give the stakeholders a sense of common 
cause without compromising the association’s independence and so its rationale. It is particularly 
important that these stakeholders agree on the principles of evaluation to be used in the 
guidebook, and on the procedures for withdrawing the stamp from those judged not to have 
followed these principles. 
Creating the evaluation association would involve moderate monetary start-up costs, as 
well as continuing costs associated with the operation of a new professional organization. These 
costs would be comparatively minor were the association to become effective in improving the 
evaluation of development projects. The association would also generate the transaction costs 
associated with adding any new layer of bureaucracy to a managerial system. These bureaucratic 
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costs seem worth bearing. One general difficulty in development is that there are few cross-
institutional mechanisms of accountability whose specific aim is to increase aid effectiveness. 
The institutional frameworks that link development agencies are weak and unstructured, just as 
the institutions of governance in many poor countries are weak and unstructured. And evaluation 
in particular is still in its early stages of evolution: there are many development specialists who 
have observed the genesis of the entire field within the span of their own careers.54 Getting the 
institutional setting right for evaluation, so that incentives point in the right direction and 
information flows more freely among aid agencies, has the potential significantly to increase 
understanding of what aid works.55 
The proposed evaluation association would be a mechanism of horizontal accountability 
that makes evaluators more accountable to their peers. In providing this level of horizontal 
accountability, the association would also generate information about project effectiveness that 
would increase the vertical accountability of aid agencies to funding bodies, and eventually 
perhaps even to rich individuals. However, even if the evaluation association did come to be 
successful, its beneficial effects would be primarily at the level of improved design and 
implementation of projects. The association would leave many of the problems of diverted 
resources and project aggregation unaddressed. Given the generally low starting level of 
accountability in development aid, and the need for care because of the potential risks of 
reforms, such proposals for modest progress seem the best that can be hoped. 
 
Conclusion 
Development aid poses a series of complex challenges. Projects must both fit and revise 
local skills and customs; the institutional setting within which the projects are undertaken is 
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typically dysfunctional or chaotic; more powerful actors at all levels are constantly attempting to 
capture the resources intended for the worst-off; and the conglomeration of development efforts 
can generate anti-development effects. It is these difficulties and the uncertain record of aid 
effectiveness that have spurred movements for greater accountability in development aid.  
Morally, the greatest need for accountability would be for the rich to be accountable to 
the poor for effective and sufficient development aid. But significant accountability of that kind 
is non-existent and probably impossible. The second most important connection of accountability 
would be for intermediate institutions to become more accountable for the effectiveness of 
projects either to the rich individuals who fund them or to the poor individuals who are meant to 
benefit from them. However, the complexities of development work and the poor’s lack of power 
means that there is currently little significant accountability to either rich or poor individuals.  
Where there is some degree of accountability it is between the intermediate institutions. 
In some cases like with USAID, the accountability mechanisms in place do not work to reduce 
poverty. In these cases, there is a strong case for institutional reform. In other cases, as with aid 
NGOs, accountability for effective poverty relief is almost entirely absent. This is not in itself an 
indictment of aid NGOs. Greater accountability is not always good, and when greater 
accountability in development agencies would be good its value is only instrumental, not 
intrinsic. The overriding value when considering reform of aid institutions is what works to 
reduce poverty. There is a need to be more forthright about the current lack of accountability 
among development agencies. This would help to shift the focus onto specific proposals for 
increasing accountability that will lead to long-term improvements in the lives of the world’s 
poor.  
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